Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

2-1-1988

Tariffs and Saving in a Model with New Families
Charles Engel
Kenneth Kletzer

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Engel, Charles and Kletzer, Kenneth, "Tariffs and Saving in a Model with New Families" (1988). Discussion
Papers. 561.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/561

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connectic ut 06520

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 553

TARIFFS AND SAVING IN A MODEL WITH NEW FAMILIES

Charles Engel
Universit y of Virginia

and

Kenneth Kletzer
Yale Universit y

February 1988

Notes:

Center Discussio n Papers are prelimina ry materials circulate d to
stimulate discussio n and critical comments. Reference s in
publicati ons to Discussio n Papers should be cleared with the
authors to protect the tentative character of these papers.
We would like to thank Jonathan Eaton and Willem Buiter for useful
comments.

Tariffs and Saving in a Model with New Families

ABSTRACT

The

paper

explores

how

a

tariff

may

affect

saving

through

intergenerational redistribution of income that is caused by changes in factor
prices

and

by

Blanchard-type

the

distribution

overlapping

of

tariff

generations

revenue.

model.

Two

The
types

model
of

is

a

revenue

distribution schemes are examined -- lump-sum distribution of current revenues
to currently living individuals, and distribution as a subsidy to holders of
physical wealth.

(There is no fiscal policy in this paper -- the government

budget is continuously balanced).
non-neutralities

that

arise

in

We draw some general conclusions about the
this

type

of

model

as

opposed

single-generation models, or mode1~ in which perfect bequest motives exist.

to

1.

Introduction

In policy discussions , it is often suggested that increased tariffs will
improve a country's current account.
immediately

obvious

how

a

To the economic theorist, it is not

distortiona ry

tax

change

should

affect

the

incentives to save and invest -- whose difference comprises a current accotmt
imbalance.

Here we take a look at one aspect of the effect of tariffs on

saving in a neoclassica l model.
This paper analyzes the effects of tariffs on saving in a small open
economy using the uncertain lifetimes version of the overlapping generations
Several authors 1

model, developed by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1984, 1985),

have used this model to examine the role of public sector budget deficits
because

it

fails

to

display

intertempor al pattern of net
effects.

Ricardian

debt-neutra lity,

lump-sum transfers

that

the

individuals has

real

We examine the intertempor al effects of a permanent tariff change,

abstracting from other aspects of fiscal policy.
incidence

to

so

of

the

tariff

across

different

The distributio n of the

factors,

and

the

method

of

distribution of the tariff revenue, have important consequence s for aggregate
per capita saving and, therefore, the current account.

The intersector al

and intergenera tional effects of the tariff have intertempor al impacts for the

1

See Blanchard ( 1984, 1985).

In the internation al context,

see Buiter

(1986a,b,c), Frenkel and Razin (1986), Kouri (1986), van Wijnbergen (1985),
Eaton (1987), Smith (1987) and our earlier paper, Engel and Kletzer (1986),
See also Weil (1985).

1

same reason that debt-neutra lity fails; however we constrain the public sector
budget to be in balance continuousl y. 2
After laying out the model in section 2, we proceed by examining first a
special

case

domesticall y.

of

the

the

tariff

in which

the

import

good

is

not

produced.

Tariff revenue is assumed to be redistribute d. lump-sum to

living individuals .
in

model

has

We find that under this distributio n scheme, the change
consequence s

for

aggregate

saving.

The

tariff

is

essentially an equal tax on both physical wealth and non-tangibl e wealth,
while the lump-sum redistribut ion is a subsidy only to non-tangibl e wealth.
When the incidence of the tariff cum subsidy scheme is not neutral across
generations , total expenditure in this economy is affected because of the
imperfect claim of currently living individuals on income from non-tangibl e
assets in the future.
We next take up models in which the import good is produced.

Here, a

change in the tariff has additional effects on expenditure through its power
to change the factoral distributio n of income.
It is important to note that these effects are different than those that
appear in other models of the current account in which no new generations are
born.

(In fact, both of these effects are present even when the tariff would

have no effect on saving in a model with a single generation. ) 3

As we will

show, the fact that new generations are born with an imperfect bequest motive

2

Our analysis of the distributio nal impact of taxes bears some resemblance
to that of Chamley and Wright (1987).

3

This general feature of the uncertain lifespans model has also been noted

by Buiter ( 1986b).

2

means that even a small tariff will alter saving.

These effects occur even in

the absence of any first-ord er distortio n, or presence of a "pure substitut ion
effect". 4
In section 4, we consider an alternativ e scheme for redistrib ution of
tariff revenue.

If the economy has positive holdings of tangible assets

(foreign currency bonds and land), the revenue is redistribu ted as a subsidy
to tangible assets.

If there are net negative holdings of tangible assets,

the revenue is redistrib uted as a subsidy to net tangible debt.

We show that

for any given level of the tariff, the governmen t has a choice of how to
redistrib ute revenue.

If they choose to subsidize steady-st ate tangible

assets, the steady-st ate tangible asset position will be positive.

If they

choose to have a negative subsidy rate to steady-st ate tangible assets -
hence, a positive subsidy to steady-st ate tangible debt -- the economy will
have a negative position in tangible assets in steady state.

Thus,

by

choosing how to set the subsidy rate for any given tariff rate, the governmen t
can determine the net position in tangible assets in steady state for the
economy.

We then show how changes in the tariff rate affect saving.

Section 5 concludes .

4

See for

example Razin and Svensson

( 1983),

Edwards

( 1987)

and the

endogenou s discount rate model in our earlier paper, Engel and Kletzer (1986).
There are first-ord er effects in Razin and Svensson because the consumers '
price indices are allowed to change from period to period.
in our model.

Edwards also introduce s non-trade d goods.

3

We rule this out

2.

The Model

We study a small count ry that takes as given the world
inter est rate, r,
and the world price of good 2 in terms of good 1, which
we set equal to one.
Both goods are trade d and consumed. We consi der the effec
ts of incre asing a
tarif f on good 2.
Goods are produ ced using stand ard neocl assic al produ
ction proce sses.
There are at least two facto rs of produ ction, so facto
r return s and outpu t
level s are determ ined exact ly. All facto r suppl ies are
const ant (there are no
interm ediate goods , and all non-l abor facto rs can be consi
dered to be types of
land) and are norma lized to one. With uncha nging facto
r suppl ies and relati ve
price of comm oditie s, facto r return s and outpu t level s
are const ant over time.
A perma nent chang e in the tarif f may lead to a once
and for all shift in
facto r price s and produ ction level s. The produ ction side
of the economy can
be left in this gener al form for the dynamic analy
sis, altho ugh we will
compa re the effec t of a perma nent tarif f chang e for three
speci al cases : only
the expor t good is produ ced; both goods are produ ced
in the Hecks cher-O hlin
model ; and, both goods are produ ced in the speci fic-fa ctors
model .
House hold consu mptio n behav ior is deriv ed using the uncer
tain lifeti mes
versio n of the overla pping gener ations model , devel oped
by Yaari (1965) and
Blanc hard (1984 ,1985 ).
We adopt a contin uous- time versio n in which each
indiv idual faces a const ant (age and time indep
enden t) instan taneo us
proba bility of death , rr, less than unity , and there is
no beque st motiv e. At
each insta nt, a new cohor t of size rr+n is born, where
n is the const ant
propo rtiona te rate of popul ation growt h.
The dynam ics of per-c apita savin g
are ident ical for all value s of rr +n that excee d zero
(see Buite r ( 1986c) ) .

4

Weil (1985) shows that an overlappin g generatio ns model results when n is zero
and n is positive.

In a model with infinitely -lived dynastic families in

which each individua l possesses a perfect bequest motive, if there is birth of
new dynasties , then the model will lead to the same saving dynamics as in
Weil, because currently living families do not care about the consumpti on of
future dynasties .

We use Blanchard 's version in which n is positive and n

equals zero, because labor force growth is unessenti al to our examinati on of
the savings effects of tariff changes.

Therefore , the populatio n is constant

with size equal to one.
Because consumers have uncertain lifetimes , their effective subjectiv e
discount rate is o+n, where o is the positive pure rate of time preferenc e.
All forms of physical wealth are perfect substitut es, so that they earn
the same rate of return, r, as an internati onally traded bond.
consumers have access to a perfect annuities market.

We assume that

Each consumer can

contract with an insurance company to receive an additiona l rate of return rr
on tangible assets while she lives.
wealth if she dies.

In exchange, the company receives her net

Conversel y, if a consumer has negative net holdings of

tangible assets, then she agrees to pay a premium n per unit of debt on the
condition that the insurance company assumes her debt upon death.
Two types of wealth are assumed not transfera ble to the insurer for an
annuity.

The consumer 's human wealth (the discounte d value of labor income)

has no value upon death, so that the company is unwilling to pay anything for
the privilege of owning this asset after the person's death.

Also,

since

tariff revenue is distribut ed only to living persons, the individua l has no
claim to tariff revenue after death to transfer to the insurer.
the sum of these two types of wealth as non-tangi ble assets.

5

We refer to

In the Yaari-Blanc hard model, an individual born at time i will maximize
the expectation of the discounted stream of felicity of current consumption .
The objective function for an individual born at time i is given by:
00

( 1)

V. (t)
1

= /u(c . (s) ,c . (s) )e -(o+n)(s-t) ds
1
2
t

1

1

where c i (s), c i (s) are individual i's consumption at times of goods 1 and
2
1
2, respectively .
(2 )

The individual' s budget constraint at time tis
wit= (r+n)wit +wit+ Rit - 1 it'

wit is tangible wealth. 5

Income from non-tangibl e wealth. is given by the sum

of labor income, wit' and net transfers, Rit'

Expenditure at domestic prices

on consumables is denoted by Iit' which equals the sum c i (t) + pc i (t), where
1
2
pis the domestic (cum tariff) price of good 2. The details of the derivation
of individual and aggregate consumption dynamics are given in the Appendix.
We make the assumptions that the felicity function, u(c ,c ), is homothetic
1 2
and displays constant relative risk aversion to allow linear aggregation of
individuals ' consumption plans.
An

important feature of the Yaari-Blanc hard model

is

that

the pure

subjective rate of discount need not equal the world rate of interest to
assure convergence of aggregate per capita.

wealth and consumption to steady

state values under individual intertempor al optimizatio n.

Because individuals

face a positive probability of death at each instant, aggregate per capita
wealth can converge to a finite level when r exceeds 8 , even though each
individual plans to accumulate unbounded. wealth over an infinite horizon (and

5

The"·" above a letter refers to its time derivative.

6

analogo usly, when o exceeds r).

Individ uals born at any given time compri se

an expone ntially decreas ing fractio n of the popula tion as they age (in
Weil
(1985), this happen s through popula tion growth alone).

The append ix restate s

Blanch ard's conditi on for existen ce and stabili ty of the steady state.
Output of the two goods is given by yl and y . Aggreg ate consum ption is
2
represe nted by c and c . Total expend iture at domest ic prices is given
by
1
2

Total expend iture at world prices is

Tariff revenue in the aggreg ate is given by

The aggreg ate lump-sum transfe r to consum ers at time t, Rt' equals the
actual
tariff revenue collect ed at time t.
sector budget.

We assume a continu ously balance d public

Because felicit y is homoth etic, the age distrib ution of total

revenue has no consequ ences if the transfe r is lump-sum and receive d only
by
those curren tly alive.
The aggreg ate value of non-tan gible wealth (aggreg ating as in Blanch ard)
is given by:

(The wage rate is age indepen dent so that

0

depends only on rand p for the

small country , and rand p do not change -- except for the one time perman
ent
change in p from the tariff. )
Aggreg ate tangib le wealth, wt, is defined by

7

bt is aggregate net claims on foreigners.

at is the value of land.

Under the

constant returns to scale production assumption,
( 3)

Therefore, at depends only on the paths of p and r.
Aggregate consumption at any time t

is given by the simple linear

relationships (see the Appendix):

(4)
clt = (1 - ry(p))It' and

where
11

and O

::c;

ry ;s; 1;

= r + rr + (o - r) /a ,

ry' (p) ~ O.

The coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by a.
Aggregating as in Blanchard yields equations for accumulation of tangible
and non-tangible assets:
( 5)

and,
( 6)

N = (r+rr)N - (0 + R ).
t
t
t
Note that tariff revenues may be expressed as

where

8

a(p)

=

1

[1 - -

p

]77(p).

In what fallows , we will genera lly asstm1e a'

> 0.

example , with Cobb-D ouglas utility (77' (p) = 0).

This would hold,

for

It could be violate d if the

demand elastic ity of substit ution between goods is suffici ently high
and
initial tariff levels are suffici ently greate r than zero.
The tangib le wealth acctm1u lation equatio n can be rewritt en as
(7)

.

.

Since at is consta nt over time, bt = wt.

Also note that

(8)

Equatio ns (3) , ( 7) and ( 8) may be used to derive
(9)

Equatio ns (4), (5), (7) and (8) give the dynami cs of expend iture at world
prices:
(10)

(Remember, at is consta nt.)
Equatio ns (9) and ( 10) constit ute a second order dynamic system that
express es the motion of the economy.
The steady -state levels of z and b can be obtaine d by setting b = 0
in
equatio n (9) and z = 0 in equatio n (10).

6
7

We get 6 ' 7

A - over a variab le represe nts its steady -state value.
The stabili ty conditi on implies (il-r) (r+11) - at-.11 > 0, and t-. > r > 0.
z > O.

These facts are demons trated in the Append ix.

9

So,

~n( 1-a)
( 11)

and

z -

(12)

'6 =
r

The append ix shows the conditi ons under which the dynami c system
is
saddle stable. The accumu lation of bonds over time is given by
(13)

where 0 < 0 is the stable root of the system.

3.

Effects of Tariff Change s

Here we examine the effects of increas ing the tariff perman ently at some
time.

We are particu larly interes ted in the respons e of saving and the

curren t accoun t.
foreign ers,

At the moment the tariff is imposed , the countr y's claims on

bt, cannot jump.

So,

from equatio n

( 13),

increas e in tariffs on saving and the curren t accoun t,

the effect of an
startin g from a

positio n of steady state is given by (recall the assump tion that a' >
0)
(14)

10

which has the same sign as db/da. 8

a.

Specializ ation in Productio n of the Export Good

In the case in which the import good (good 2) is not produced, the wage
rate, w, and the value of land, a, are unaffecte d by changes in the tariff.
Output of good 2, y , is zero, and output of good 1 will not respond to tariff
2
movements.
From equation (12)
(15)

db/da = (1/r)(dz/ da).

From (11),

(16)

dz/da =
a [ ( 1'1- r ) ( r + n ) - al'! 7T] 2

0

as

> o.
r <

Hence, from ( 14) , ( 15) and ( 16) it follows that an increase in tariffs will
improve the current account (increase saving) when the personal discount rate
is less than the world interest rate, but will worsen the current account
(lower saving) when the discount rate exceeds the world interest rate.

8

If we are
(b-b)d0/d a.

initially away from

steady state,

db/da

=

-0 (db/da)

+

From the expressio n fore in the appendix, d0/da = An((A+n) 2

4aAn)- 112 > O.

If initially the current account is in deficit, so (b-b) > 0,

then the effect of a tariff increase on the current account is more positive
relative to a starting position of current account balance, and vice-vers a for
a current account initially in surplus.

11

It is useful to pursue this from a different tack to develop intuition.
From equation (9)

Hence
dzJda = (0/r)(dz/da ).
When long-run expenditure z rises,

current expenditure ,

zt,

falls.

An

increase in the tariff will cause zt to rise when 5 >rand fall when r > 8.
From equation (4)

ctI /da =
t

~

dN /da.
t

Nt will change when the tariff rises because the discounted value of tariff
revenue will increase.

This value depends on the expected amount of change in

expenditure currently and in the future.

The appendix demonstrate s that

starting from steady state
0(0-r)

So, dit/da > 0.

r

>

o.

Expenditure measured in domestic goods prices necessarily

increases as the tariff rises.
Now zt = It - Rt' under complete specializati on.

Clearly if r > 8, the

increase in tariff revenue exceeds the increase in It (so zt falls), and when

o > r, the increase in It exceeds the increase in tariff revenue.
It is very helpful to consider the special case of free trade initially.
Then,

We also have

12

d.NJda = I/(r +

1l),

which simply equals the discmmted value of a permanent increase in tariff
revenue equal to today's increase.

We can write

So
6 -

=

(r

+ n +

r
dN /da

a

t

= (1 +

6-r
a( r+n) ) dR/da.

When o > r (r > 8) the marginal propensity to consume out of pennanent income
is greater than (less than) one, and
8-r

=

= a(r+n)

In the complete specialization model,
increase
generates

in spending
future

a tariff increase leads to an

in terms of domestic prices.

income

(in

terms

of

increases the value of non-tangible wealth.

I.

domestic

The

prices)

tariff
and,

revenue

therefore,

If the increase in spending falls

short of the increase in current tariff revenue (8

< r) , saving and the

current account increase, but if the increase in spending exceeds the increase
in current revenue (8 > r), saving and the current account decline.
In moo.els in which no new families are born and there is a perfect
bequest motive, if there were no distortions in the economy (such as existing
tariffs) a small increase in tariffs would have no effect on expenditure
(except possibly through a "pure substitution effect" which is ruled out here

13

by our assumpti ons on preferen ces) . 9 It is importan t to note that in this

model even when the initial tariff is zero, a small increase in tariffs has a
first order effect on expendi ture.
Conside r for a moment a scheme for redistri buting tariff revenue that
makes

the

impositi on

of

a

tariff

neutral.

Since

tariff

revenue

proporti onal to expendi ture measured in terms of the domestic good,
subsidy to expendi ture clearly would neutrali ze the effect of the tariff.

is

I, a
In

this case we know

But, then using equation (8), we would have

Tariff revenue would be given by

Notice that in this case the tariff is effectiv ely a proporti onal tax on total
wealth (wt + Nt) at the rate (a/( 1-a) )i'..

9

The tariff is neutral when the

See Engel and Kletzer (1986) for a demonst ration of this in a model with

a represe ntative consume r who has an infinite horizon and an endogeno us rate
of time preferen ce.

Ra.zin and Svensson ( 1983) discuss a "pure subs ti tut ion

effect" that is ruled out by assurnpt ion in this model.

Because the felicity

function is identica l in all periods, and prices are constan t, the exact price
index does not change over time in our set-up.

14

revenue is rebated as a proportio nal subsidy to total wealth.lo
In

contrast,

under

the

lump-st.nn

redistrib ution

to

living

persons

considere d in this section, the tariff is still a proportio nal tax on total
wealth:
Rt = a.ti (wt + Nt) ,
but the revenue is returned purely as a subsidy to non-tangi ble wealth.

The

tariff changes consumpti on because the redistribu tion scheme has first-ord er
effects on expenditu re.
When there is a permanent increase in the tariff, total wealth is taxed
at a greater rate both now and in the future.

The tax on tangible wealth is a

fully-cap italized loss to living individua ls (because of the perfect annuities
market).

The losses from the tax on future non-tangi ble wealth are only

partially capitaliz ed by living individua ls.
would

be

to

return

non-tangi ble wealth.

the

revenue

in

an

A neutral redistrib ution scheme
equal

subsidy

to

tangible

and

Any other scheme has consequen ces for total expenditu re

measured at world prices.

For example, the lump-sum redistrib ution considere d

in this section takes revenue from taxes on tangible and non-tangi ble wealth
and redistrib utes it purely as a subsidy to non-tangi ble assets.

In section 4

we consider another non-neutr al scheme in which the revenue is redistrib uted

10

Under the "neutral" scheme, the level of c

1

and c

2

will change (because

the tariff is a tax on c , but all e:xl'.)enditure is subsidize d). However, c +
2
1
c
(=z) will not be affected.
Of course, expenditu re in domestic prices
2
changes as (p-1 ) c

2

is altered,

but this is exactly the change in tariff

revenue.

15

as a subsidy to tangible assets. 11
In this section, both forms of wealth are being taxed by the tariff but
the revenue is all corning back as a lump-sum transfer.

In the future, that

revenue (which will be generated partially by a tax on physical assets and
partially by a

tax on non-tangible assets)

will be redistributed to all

individuals who are alive at that time -- some of whom are not yet born.
Thus, living individuals are not fully compensated for the burden of
they bear.

The only neutral scheme

the tax

would give

as a lumJrsum redistribution to individuals living at any time only that share
of the revenue collected that is effectively a tax on non-tangible wealth.
With lump-sum redistribution of revenues, the burden of the tax is not spread
across generations in the same way as the redistribution of the revenue -
which causes the pattern of saving to change across generations.

b.

Both Goods Produced

In addition to the effect on saving generated by redistribution of tariff
revenue,

there is an effect on total expenditure caused by changes in the

factor cornposition of income.
good are

In a model where both the export and import

produced domestically,

production,

the change

Eaton

( 1987)

there

in the domestic

implications for spending levels.
11

and

are

relative

at

least

two

price of the

factors

of

goods

has

In particular, if the tariff adjusts the

considers a similar model,

but one

in which there are

monopoly firms that have a claim on tariff revenue (yet another non-neutral
redistribution scheme).

16

size of income derived from tangibl e versus non-tan gible f onns of
wealth,
aggreg ate saving may be altered .
This effect is separa te from any impact the tariff may have on saving
by
decreas ing the total value of output at world prices from the distort
ionary
effects of non-lum p-sum truces.

To make this point most forcefu lly, we will

first conside r a small tariff startin g from a point of free trade, so
that
distort ions are second -order small.

Thus, this effect is not presen t in those

models with no new familie s and perfec t beques t motive s.
It is useful to note from equatio n (3) above that the value of land, at'
can be express ed as
(17)

The value of land equals the value of output at world prices less the value
of
the output of labor and the value of the tariff distort ion of output.
Also, note that non-tan gible wealth can be express ed as
(p-l)y 2
r+n

(J

(18)

Nt = r+n

(l)

+ Jare-( r+rr)( s-t)ds .
s
t

From equatio n (4), expend iture at domest ic prices , It' is propor tional
to
the

Sl.ll'Il

of tangib le and non-tan gible wealth.

Examin ation of equatio ns (17)

and ( 18) reveal how a change in tariffs will affect It .

In the previou s

section we saw the effects of a perman ent tariff increas e on the
discoun ted values of future aI .
s

comes from changes in

Sl.ll'Il

of the

But here there is an additio nal effect that

(p-l)y . For exampl e, if the tariff raises the wage
2
rate (in terms of the export able), the value of non-tan gible wealth increas
es
<.J

-

by (1/(r+n )) times the change in the wage.
by (1/r) times the change in the wage.

17

However, the value of land falls

The total effect of a given increas e

in wages on wealth and spending is negative, because the social discount rate
that values the flow of income from tangible assets, r,
correspondi ng interest rate for non-tangibl e assets, r+n.

is less than the
The future changes

in the product of land are fully capitalized into the current value of land
(because of the perfect annuities market), but future changes in wage income
are not (because in the future the labor force will consist only partly of
those living now, and partly of some who are not currently alive) .

Unlike

models where agents have infinite lives, a change in the source of factor
income has implication s for the total value of wealth.
A simple expression can be derived for the change in It when tariffs

increase, starting from initially free trade.

Note, first, in this case

We then have

The first term in this expression is identical to the one discussed at length
in the previous section,

and the second term corresponds to the effect

explained in the preceding paragraph.

Yz

(Note that there is no change in y

1

+

if we start at free trade and have an infinitesim al increase in the tariff

rate.)

The change in expenditure at world prices, zt' which in this case

equals the negative of the change in saving and the current account, is given
by:
dz/dp = [ (o-r)a' /a(r+n) JI

-

[nfi./r(r+n)] (dw/dp - y ).
2

The change in expenditure depends on how wages in terms of the export
good change, but the size and direction of this movement depends upon the

18

productio n structure .

In a Heckscher -Ohlin set-up, in which both goods are

produced with intersect orally mobile land and labor, the rate will rise if the
protected sector is labor-int ensive and fall if that sector is land-inte nsive.
The value of land will rise if the protected sector is land-inte nsive, and
conversel y if the protected sector is labor-inte nsive.

The size of these

effects also depends upon the exact productio n function.

Thus, taking into

account the effects of tariffs on factor prices makes the response of saving
to tariffs ambiguous .
In a specific- factors model in which labor is free to move between
sectors, but other factors cannot, the increase in the tariff will raise the
wage in terms of the export good.

The value of land in the export sector will

decline, and the value of land in the import sector will rise.

Again, the

total effect of the tariff on saving is ambiguous .
The general ex-press ion for the change in saving starting from a position
in which a tariff was already in place is given by:
db _ - ea rq r - 8 }a' [ c..>
dp -

a[

-

(

p- 1 )y

(a-r) (r+·1l) - adnJ 2

1

2

0(1-a)dn
de..>
dy
2
r[(d-r)( r+n) - adn) [-y2+dp -(p-l)dp J

In general, the sign of this derivativ e is indetermi nate.
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4.

Alternate Redistrib ution Scheme

In the previous section, all tariff revenue was redistribu ted as lump-sum
transfers to the currently alive.

This scheme has the effect of increasin g

the value of non-tangi ble wealth (for the "usual" case in which a rises with
the tariff rate).

An

interestin g alternati ve is the redistrib ution of tariff

revenue in the form of a subsidy to tangible assets.

In this section, we

consider the remittanc e of all current tariff revenue through a linear subsidy
to holdings of tangible wealth.
the tax on non-wage income

This scheme is identical to a reduction of

(interest and rents)

financed by the

tariff

increase in a model with a more complex fiscal policy in place.
To isolate the effect of the change in the redistribu tion plan, we assume
that the country is completel y specializ ed in productio n of the exportabl e.
The tariff revenue is redistribu ted in proportio n to each living individua l's
tangible wealth, so that the aggregate transfer is 1\wt' where
proportio nate rate.

!\

is the

The effective market return on these assets becomes r + n

+ Bt > O.
Total tariff revenue is given by art, where a is as previousl y defined.
The balanced budget requireme nt implies that
{19)

a.rt = !\wt'

at all times.
rand w.

While a is a constant for a fixed tariff rate, B will vary with

Therefore , the model is now non-linea r.

In the Blanchard model, net holdings of tangible assets, wt' can assume
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negative values.

This can happen if total foreign indebtednes s exceeds the

total value of land.

In order to satisfy equation (19), clearly Bt must be

negative in these cases, since a and It are always positive.
wt < 0, and 8 t > 0

~

Hence, fit< 0 <=+

wt > 0.

The dynamics of aggregate tangible wealth and consumption expenditure
valued in world prices are given by (see Appendix):
(20)
(21)
where At is defined by
_1
ilt

J f:

00

=

e

[(

r-6 ) / a - ( r+ n ) ] + ( {1-a ) / a )8 ( u) du

ds.

t
Using

(19)

and recalling that zt = (1-a.)It, equation

(20)

becomes.

(22)
Equations ( 21) and ( 22) are a dynamic system in two variables.

The

appendix demonstrate s the conditions under which this system is saddle stable.
An equation for the accumulatio n of foreign bonds near steady state is given

by

As

discussed at the beginning of section 3, the change in saving and the

current account in response to a tariff increase, starting from steady state,
has the same sign as the change in b, the long run position in internation al
bonds.
Setting z

=0

and w

= 0,

steady-state tangible wealth is given by:
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(r+B-o)/ a
(23)

w

=
(r+n+B) (n-(r+B- 6)/a)

The stability condition s imply ( 11 - ( r+B-o )/a) > 0, so
O

#

<0

r+B-8 < O.

From the discussio n above, this implies B > 0

r+B -8 < 0.

#

w> 0 ~ r+iJ-o
#

> 0 and

w<

r+B-6 >O and B

More will be said about this presently .

Because only the export good is produced, the tariff will not change the
value of land, which implies dw/dp = db/dp.
db

(24)

From (23) we have

w

=
dfi

(r+B-6)

This result is entirely plausible -- an increase in the subsidy to tangible
wealth increases the steady-st ate holdings of that type of wealth in the form
of foreign bonds.

We need to investiga te how B changes when the tariff

increases to understan d the effects of tariffs on the current account.

In

those cases in which an increase in p causes lJ to rise, saving and the current
account will rise, and when an increase in pleads to a decrease in i'J, saving
and the current account decline.
Solving for relation (19) in steady state yields a quadratic relations hip
between a and B:
an A = [j ( ( r +iJ - 8) /a) ,

(25)

where,

A = ( r + n + i3 - (r + B - o ) /a ) .
This implies that the constrain t ( 19) does not determine B uniquely for any
tariff rate.

For any given a, there are two choices for 8 that satisfy (19).

This is perhaps easiest to understan d in the case in which there is no
tariff.

Clearly B

= 0 satisfies the governmen t budget constrain t.
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But it is

also true that B = o - r will ensure a balance d budget in steady -state.

Such

a choice will lead steady -state wealth to be zero, so total subsid ies
will
also be zero.
We can derive an expres sion for local deriva tives of B with respec t to
a:
dB/da = nX 2 /[ (X-73) (r+B-cS )/a + 73 (r+n+B

(26)

By the stabil ity conditi on,

X-

~

> 0.

)/a].

Recalli ng that when 73 is positiv e when

r + B - o is positi ve, then the deriva tive is positiv e if B is positiv
e and
conver sely.

Figure 1 shows the relatio n between a and /J when r > cS •

This country

would have positiv e steady -state holding s of tangibl e assets in the absence
of
any subsidy to wealth or debt.
negativ e (= o - r).

When a is zero (p = 1), Bis either zero or is

For positiv e values of a., there is always a positiv e B

that satisfi es the governm ent budget constr aint (the top half of the
graph) .
If this Bis chosen , then clearly r + B - o is greate r than zero, and
steady
state w is positiv e.

But it is also true for all positiv e values of a there

is a negativ e value of B < o -r which satisfi es equatio n (19).

In this case,

r + B - o < O, and steady -state foreign debt exceeds the value of land

negativ e).

(w

is

Here the tariff revenue is rebated as a subsidy to negativ e

holding s of tangib le wealth .
Figure 2 takes up the case in which in the absence of subsid ies the
country would be long-ru n debtors in tangibl e wealth -- that is, the
case in
which cS > r.

If a is zero, Bis either zero or o - r > 0.

Again, for any

positiv e value of a there is a positiv e value of fi that satisfi es the balance
d
budget require ment.
and

wis

positiv e.

In this case 73 > 8 - r, which implies that r + B- cS > 0,
It is also the case that there is a negativ e value of B
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Figure 1

S -r

Figure 2

that sets total subsidie s equal to total tariff revenue.

B, r

+

R - o < 0, and

For these choices of

w< 0.

The governm ent can always choose a value of fl to ensure that long-nm
foreign debt is less than the value of land
vice-ver sa if it wants

w< 0).

(w

>

0)

if it so chooses (and

It can do so by altering the rate of return on

tangible assets availab le to resident s.

(This ultimate ly means changing the

country 's internat ional debt position , since in the aggrega te the value of
land holdings cannot be altered .)

Perhaps the surprisi ng thing is that it can

always choose such a subsidy rate and keep the budget balanced irrespec tive of
the relation of

o tor.

Using equation s ( 24) and ( 26) we can see how the current account must
change as tariffs. increase .

Not surprisi ngly, when B is positive , so

w

is

positive , an increase in the tariff will increase the subsidy to tangible
wealth

and

therefor e

Likewise , when 73

increase

current

is negative , so

w is

saving

and

the

current

account .

negative , as the tariff rises the

subsidy to tangible debt goes up, and present saving and the current account
.
12
d ec1 1.ne.

12

This analysis assumes that when the tariff changes infinite simally , the

subsidy rate does not jump discrete ly.
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4.

Conclusio n

In models with only one generatio n of consumers , tariffs influence saving
through changes in wealth caused by the tariff distortio n.

That channel of

influence is present in our overlappi ng generatio ns model with uncertain

l 1'fespans. 13
However, we emphasize other channels which are special in models in which
new

families

are

born.

The

tariff

can

change

total

wealth

redistrib uting income between tangible and non-tangi ble assets.

through

This happens

in the first place when tariff revenue is redistrib uted llllilp-sum and takes on
the characte ristics of labor income.

It also occurs because tariffs change

factor prices, which in turn alter the distribut ion of wealth between land and
human wealth.
We also ex-plore a mechanism by which the proceeds from tariffs can be
rebated in a way to affect the incentive s to hold tangible assets.

We show

that governmen t has some scope to significa ntly affect the net holdings of
internatio nal bonds while still maintaini ng budget balance.
The analysis in this paper is purely positive.

Conclusio ns about the

welfare effects of the tariffs are not drawn, and would in general depend upon

13

In the absence of distortio ns tariffs can change saving through the

substitut ion effect discussed in Razin and Svensson ( 1983).
non-zero when price indices change over time.

The effect is

That is ruled out here by the

assumptio ns of identical felicity functions over time and constant prices.

25

the weights given to the utility of the differe nt genera tions. 14

We are not

able to contrib ute to the issue of whethe r tariffs should be used to alter
the
curren t accoun t.

14

Calvo and Obstfe ld (1985) is a genera l examin ation of welfare issues in

this type model.
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Appen dix

The purpo se of this appen dix is to fill in some of
the steps in the
deriv ation s discu ssed in the text.

Models with Lump-Sum Subsi dies
Indiv idual s
const raint

(2).

maximize

utilit y

given

by

(1)

subje ct

to

the

budge t

We assume const ant relat ive risk avers ion and homo thetic

prefe rence s, so the indir ect felic ity funct ion, v, for
indiv idual i can be
writte n as
v.(I,p ) = [I.1-a /(1-a )Jv(p ).
l
l

The Hami ltonia n for perso n i's optim izatio n proble m is
given by
H = [I.1-a/(1-a )Jv(p ) + q[(r+ n)w. + w + R. - I.).
l.
l
l

The first- order condi tions yield

These imply
aii/ Iit = r - 0 1
or,
I it = I ise [(r-o )/a)( t-s)
We use the trans yersa lity condi tion
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l

Using

the

transvers ality

condition ,

we

integrate

the

dynamic

budget

constrain t (2) to get
(l)

It I.ise -(r+n)(s-t)ds = wit+ Nit'
where Nit is defined by
(l)

I

R.is e

-(r+n) (s-t) ds,

t

noting that all individua ls are paid

w

for their labor.

Using our expressio n for Iit we get

Aggregati on to derive expressio ns for It' Nt and wt follow directly as in
Blanchard (1985, pp.
general

constant

228-229).

relative

Note that we are able to aggregate for a

risk

aversion

utility

function

because

r

is

constant.
The steady-st ate values z and

.

5 come directly from equations (9) and

.

(10), setting z and b to zero and using the definitio n of at given in equation
( 3).

Note that under this revenue transfer scheme, the model is linear.
The eigenvalu es of the dynamic system are given by the solution to
(r

+ n -

-0 ) ( r -

t:,

e ) = (1 -

which yields the negative root

e = ( 1/2 l [ 2r +

T(

-

The system is saddle stable when e is negative.
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a. ) j_ n

We must prove two propos itions -- that saddle stabili ty (0 < 0) implies
/J.

> r > 0, and (/J. -r) ( rt'Tt) - a/J. rr > 0.
Note that (/J.t1t) 2 - 4a/J.1r = (/J.-1r) 2 + 4( 1-a)/J.7T.
( ( /J. +1r) 2 - 4aA rr) 112 must be a real number.

So, as long as O < a < 1,

Also note that in the specia l case

of free trade when a = 0, e = r -A and both propos itions follow innnedi
ately
from e < 0.
In genera l, first take the case in which 2r +
implies that
(/J. t

Tl )

e

ft

-

!J.

> O.

Note that this

equals one-ha lf of 2r + rr - A minus the positiv e square root of

2 - 4a/J. Tl ,

First, we will show in this case /J. > r > O.
smalle st that

e

Suppose /J. < 0.

Then the

can be is when a= 1, so that

e

= (l/2)(2r +1r-li-( (A+rr} 2-4a/J.rr} 112 } = r > O,

hence a contra diction , so /J. > 0.
Since A > 0, it follows immedi ately from compar ing the a= 0 root (which
equals r - /J. ) , that r - Ii < 0 < 0 , so A > r.
Now, to show in this case that (/J.-r)(r +1r) - aA1r > O, note that we have
(2r + rr -/J. ) 2 < (n + !J. ) 2 - 4aA rt •
Multip lying out and cancel ling direct ly yields our result.
The second case is when 2r + rr - Ii < 0.

Note first in this case that Ii >

r directl y.
We also have

(o- r )( r+ rr )

- aA 1r > ( A- r }( r+ 77 }

-

A 77

= -rrt + r (/J. -r)

> -r" + r(r+n)
=
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r)

0,

II

(becaus e 2r+rr-/J. > 0)

The deriva tions of section 3 are straigh tforwa rd until dNt/da .

This

expres sion can be derived directl y by calcula ting the express ion for
Nt from
its definit ion and using the fact that it= 0(It to get it is by the back door.

I).

However, an easier way

Note that

dNida = ( 1/11) diida
= [1/(1-a )ll ][I+ dz/da ].
But,
dzida = [ (r+11-t.) / (0+t.-n -2r)] f,
where we have used I= (1/(1-a ))z, used the definit ion of z from equatio
n (11)
(with y

2

= 0), used the express ion for dz/da (equati on (16)), used the fact

that dzt/da = (0 /r) (dz/da) and made the handy substit utions
(r-o)/a = r +

11 -

~

and,
0(0+t.- n-2r) = (~-r)(r+ 11) A

a~11.

bit more manipu lation then yields the express ion for dNt/da in the text.
The subsequ ent express ions in section 3a for the cases of initial ly free

trade all follow directl y by setting a= 0 in the more genera l express ions.
Equatio n

(17)

for

non-tan gible

wealth

follows

directl y

from

the

definit ions of Nt and Rt.
The express ion for dit/dp when p = 1 initial ly can be derived from
differe ntiatin g the express ions for Nt and wt noting that It= ~(at+ bt+
Nt).
If

<.>

were unchang ed and y

2

= 0, as in section 3a, the deriva tive would be

exactly the one in that section .

That is, we would have for the case of
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a= 0

I

initia lly
dI/dp = [Lia'/ (r+n)] f.
The additi onal term, -[nli/r (r+n)] (dc.>/dp-y ) comes from the change
s in (.) and
2
(p-l)y in the expres sions for at and Nt.
2
The genera l expres sion for db/dp at the end of sectio n 3 is
derive d by
noting that
db/dp = -0 db/dp,
and differ entiat ing expres sion (12) using

Model with Subsid ies to Tangib le Assets
Under this redist ributi on scheme, the effect ive discou nt rate
includ es a
term,

i\,

which depend s upon time along an equili brium pa.th.

perfec t foresi ght.

We

assume

We also assum er+ n + Bt > O.

Settin g up the proble m in a way analog ous to the previo us sectio
n, we get
ai. /I.
1t

1t

= r - o + Bt

yieldi ng

Imposi ng the transv ersali ty condit ion and integr ating gives

where Lit is define d in the text, and
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(1)

=

fw
t

Aggre gation yield s

with wt= at+ bt and Nt = Nit'
Diffe rentia ting the expre ssion for Nt with respe ct to time
gives

Using the aggre gation techn iques of Blanc hard (1985) we
get

I

We also have
.

.

.

.

It= L\(wt + Nt) + ~t(wt + Nt)

But

so, after some cance llatio ns,

The expre ssion for zt in the text is obtain ed by using
zt = (1-a) It and
zt = (1-a) It.

The equat ion for wt comes from these facts and art= !\wt.

The expre ssion for w comes from settin g wt= 0 and zt
= 0 in equat ions
(20) and (21).

We use the fact that
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,.

r( (r+B-8 )/a) = (r+n+B) [n
which comes from setting

ar

(r+i3-o )/a]

= i3w.

The dynamic system is non-lin ear, but can be lineari zed near steady state
as

and

The stable root is given by

The system is saddle stable when A is negativ e.
We need to prove that saddle stabili ty (A < 0) implies

rr - (r+ff-o )/a = X - r - ff= Xn(l-a ) - r(r+B- 8)/a > O.
First take the case in which 2r + B + n -

X > O.

- 2
Then we must subtrac t the positiv e square root of (/3+7T-D.
)
+ 4(1-a)D-.rr

from 2r + i3 + rr -

X to

get 2A,

So, it follows that

Cancel lation yields
Kn(l-a ) - r(r+B- 8)/a > O.

The second case is when 2r + 3 + n
~ - r -

B >

X < O.
r

This implies direct ly

•

+ n > O.

Note, we have also implic itly shown in both cases K - fl> O.
The express ion for dB /da in

equatio n
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( 26)

comes

from equatio n (25} .
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